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‘Latent’ Surplus Populations and Colonial Histories of Drought, Groundnuts, and 
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Amidst growing concern about the displacement of rural populations exposed to climate change, new financial 
instruments are increasingly being presented as key tools for the management of climate risks. Index-based 
agricultural insurance (IBAI) is a particularly key example. Recent critical work has pointed to the deeply 
neoliberal character of IBAI and like interventions. However, the promotion of new financial instruments in 
response to crises of agrarian production has a much longer history in Africa and elsewhere. This article draws 
on Marx’s concept of ‘latent’ surplus populations to trace out and explain parallels between IBAI and colonial 
interventions in Senegal’s groundnut basin. Approaching the question in this way, the article highlights the 
long-run historical co-production and interdependence of the Senegalese state and a political ecology of 
groundnut production in which relations of indebtedness and the exposure to variable rainfall of a fragile 
relative surplus population has long been crucial to the mobilization of cheap labour for groundnut production. 
IBAI is thus positioned as part of a recurrent trajectory of emergency financial interventions aimed at smoothing 
out the contradictions implicit in this socio-ecological configuration. 
 




A number of authors have pointed to a growing mass of people expelled from agrarian 
livelihoods by structural adjustment, land grabbing, and accelerating climate breakdown (see 
Davis 2006; Sassen 2014). In journalist and policy accounts, concerns are growing about 
these trends leading to disorderly urbanization or migration to Europe (e.g. Pilling 2018; Lall 
et al. 2017). Senegal reflects many of these dynamics. There are growing worries about the 
viability of agrarian livelihoods, particularly in the Groundnut Basin. Groundnuts remain a 
key export crop, but the impacts of structural adjustment (see Oya and Ba 2013) have been 
compounded by a series of catastrophic droughts in the 1970s and 1980s which had lasting 
effects on vegetation and soil quality, compounded by increasingly unstable patterns of 
rainfall (see Brandt et al. 2013; Herrmann and Tappan 2013; Sarr et al. 2013; Sambou 2016; 
Turner 2016).  
 
One key response to these concerns, in Senegal and globally, has been to develop new 
financial tools aimed at improving the management of climate risks by smallholder farmers. 
Proposals for index-based agricultural insurance (IBAI) are particularly prominent here (e.g. 
World Bank 2009; Ricome et al. 2017). IBAI are crop insurance schemes seeking to 
minimize administrative costs by de-linking claims from underlying damages, instead paying 
out when an ‘index’ variable (usually rainfall) reaches a threshold correlated with crop losses 
(see Miranda and Farrin 2012; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012). There is a growing critical 
literature about IBAI, rightly arguing that the financialized conception of risk underlying 
IBAI belies the socially and historically produced nature of climate vulnerabilities faced by 
poor agrarian communities (da Costa 2013; Isakson 2015; Johnson 2013; Taylor 2016). IBAI 
perpetuates, and even deepens, the financializing, neoliberalizing thrust of contemporary 
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climate and development governance. Studies of IBAI, in short, contribute to wider debates 
about the ways in which differential exposure to the effects of climate change are 
depoliticized through their articulation as calculable, governable ‘risks’, to be addressed 
through technical interventions aimed at promoting ‘resilience’ (e.g. Stanley 2013; 
Mikulewicz and Taylor 2019). 
 
However, in a significant sense little of this is new. The narrative of agrarian crisis, 
impending depopulation of the countryside, and associated urban disorder was a prominent 
concern across colonial Africa dating to the 1930s (see Bernards 2018; Cooper 1996). As 
shown further below, the mobilization of financial techniques in response to such concerns 
has equally long roots. In Senegal, the rapid expansion of ‘Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance’ 
(SIPs), formed a core part of the response to concerns about agrarian crisis. SIPs were state-
run, cooperative schemes widely adopted across French Africa. They were flexible 
institutions operated by local administrators, but generally performed two functions -- 
providing loans in seed and cash to farmers (predominant in cash-crop regions), and 
maintaining granaries (see Mann and Guyer 1999). They were nominally meant to be self-
financing, with advances repaid (with interest) out of harvests. Although they are 
superficially quite different institutions, SIPs have a number of key features in common with 
IBAI, as shown further in sections 4 and 5. Both were articulated around ‘improving’ 
farmers’ planning and risk-management practices, sought to do so by reshaping patterns of 
indebtedness through which crop marketing was organized, linked into metropolitan circuits 
of financial capital through complex chains of state support and intermediation, and adopted 
or expanded in response to somewhat similar crises in agrarian production. 
 
This article thus asks: how can we understand IBAI not simply in terms of neoliberalism or 
financialization, but as part of a recurring tendency of crisis-driven interventions based on 
new financial instruments in (neo)colonial agrarian regimes? In Senegal, we can situate both 
IBAI and earlier interventions in relation to the long-run development of a colonial political 
ecology of groundnut production in which intersecting patterns of indebtedness and exposure 
to variable rainfall are both deeply embedded and often crucial to the mobilization of cheap 
labour. The exposure of groundnut growing regions to fluctuations in rainfall is in large part 
the product of the particular configurations of space, nature, and labour through which 
colonial production was organized. It stems simply enough from the fact that groundnut 
production is primarily rainfed; but this in itself is a product of the particular historic 
conditions under which its expansion took place, and which were reinforced by the role that 
indebtedness and seasonal rainfall subsequently came to play in organizing groundnut 
production. This suggests that rather than treating IBAI solely as an extension of ever-
widening processes of financialization or neoliberalization, we should understand it as the 
latest in a line of responses to crisis which have sought to shift farmers’ financial practices 
rather than address deep-seated social and ecological contradictions. 
 
In theoretical terms, I develop this argument by engaging with Marx’s concept of ‘latent’ 
surplus populations, alongside his historical analyses of ‘The General Law in Action’ in the 
latter parts of Chapter 25 of Vol. 1 of Capital. Latent surplus populations refer to agrarian 
populations displaced (or threatened with displacement) without entering into waged work. 
For Marx, they represent a liminal category, ‘constantly on the point of passing over’ into 
seeking waged work (1990: 876). While they don’t regularly perform standard forms of wage 
labour, latent surplus populations remain embedded in capitalist circuits of accumulation -- 
notably by producing cheap primary materials. Marx’s discussion usefully suggests an 
understanding of these forms of exploitation as intersecting with patterns of ‘secondary’ 
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exploitation (through e.g. rent, debt), uneven spatial development, and ecological 
vulnerabilities. This approach helps to situate IBAI in the longer trajectory of entanglements 
of indebtedness and exposures to variable rainfall with the particular modalities of groundnut 
production in Senegal, and to explain why interventions to manage climate risks frequently 
turn to finance. Configurations of space, nature, state, and capital have unquestionably 
changed over time, but we can usefully start answering the core question posed here by 
examining the ways in which their intersections have worked to mobilize irregular forms of 
work over the long run. 
 
The article develops these arguments in four steps. The first section below briefly reviews 
Marx’s discussions of latent surplus populations, and historical analyses of the ‘general law 
in action’. The next section discusses the long-run trajectory of groundnut production. The 
following two sections examine the crises of the 1930s and the neoliberal era, respectively, 
highlighting the contradictory dynamics of efforts to restore production through public-
private financial instruments.  
 
2. Making latent surplus populations 
The main theoretical claim in this article is that Marx’s discussion of ‘latent’ surplus 
populations, and more broadly his historical discussions of ‘the General Law in Action’ in 
Chapter 25 of Capital, help unpick the ways in which IBAI and similar interventions slot into 
longer-running entanglements of ecology, secondary exploitation, and irregular labour.  
 
While recent debates have tended to treat ‘surplus populations’ as a descriptive label for a 
segment of the population ‘not needed’ by capital for immediate exploitation through wage 
labour (e.g. Li 2010; 2017; McIntyre and Nast 2011; Tyner 2016), it is more usefully 
understood as a fluid and dynamic set of relations interpenetrated with wider working classes. 
Marx differentiates three ‘modes of existence’ of surplus populations, defined essentially by 
their spatial and temporal relation to wage labour. The ‘floating’ category refers to workers 
periodically displaced by cyclical restructuring: those workers who are ‘sometimes repelled, 
sometimes attracted again in greater masses’ (1990: 794). The ‘stagnant’ population consists 
of those reliant on ‘extremely irregular employment’ (1990: 796). Both categories are 
implicitly understood to be clustered in proximity to large-scale capitalist enterprises. By 
contrast, ‘latent’ surplus populations refer to rural populations whose livelihoods are disrupted 
by capitalisation, but who remain tied to agrarian spaces yet ‘constantly on the point of 
passing over’ into (urban) wage work (1990: 795). To start out, it is worth observing that the 
defining trait of ‘latent’ surplus populations is not so much their ‘irrelevance’ to the 
productive needs of capital as the inherently temporary and liminal nature of their status as 
‘surplus’. Marx hints that such persistent ‘non-connections’ (to use Li’s 2010 phrase) are in 
fact vital to the reproduction of capital: 
the constant movement towards the towns presupposes, in the countryside itself, a 
constant latent surplus population, the extent of which only becomes evident at 
those exceptional times when its distribution channels are wide open. (Marx 1990: 
796) 
Marx suggests, then, that the formation of ‘free’ labour requires the re-configuration of rural 
spaces in order to allow the persistence of a fragile but never-quite-fully-dislodged ‘latent’ 
surplus population.  
 
Understood along these lines, the ‘latent surplus population’ is an aggregate of ongoing 
patterns of practice, not a label for a discrete group of people. Individual workers will cycle 
between different modes of existence and between the 'surplus’ and ‘working’ population. 
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‘Surplus populations’ as historical structures are the products of many such movements over a 
long period of time -- ‘a reality that time uses and abuses over long periods’ in Braudel’s 
phrase (1980: 31). This calls for an explicitly historical analysis of how latent surplus 
populations are produced, reproduced, and change over time and across space.  
 
We can pull some clues about how such an analysis might look from Marx’s discussions of 
the ‘General Law in Action’ in the latter parts of Chapter 25, emphasizing the reconstitution 
of rural spaces in ways that facilitated irregular forms of exploitation. Firstly, surplus 
populations in this discussion remain subjected to what have been called ‘secondary’ forms of 
exploitation through debts, rent, and the like, stemming from the commodification of the 
means of survival (see Harvey 2006: 42; Soederberg 2014: 4). Secondary exploitation is 
closely linked for Marx to the mobilization of irregular forms of labour by surplus 
populations. In England, Marx notes in particular that the expulsion of agricultural labourers 
from large landholdings led to the clustering of impoverished workers into nearby villages, 
where speculators rushed to ‘buy scraps of land, which they throng as densely as they can 
with the cheapest of all possible hovels’ (1990: 840). The secondary exploitation of displaced 
peasants through these cottages laid foundations for deepening primary exploitation. 
Indebtedness, as a number of authors have recently noted, has historically often played a 
crucial role in mobilizing agrarian labour (see Gerber 2014; Toivanen and Krüger 2018). 
Indeed, as argued further in the case of Senegal below, this link between secondary 
exploitation and irregular labour exploitation seems to hold regardless of the specific form of 
property relations in place. 
 
Equally, in Marx’s account the production and maintenance of latent surplus populations is a 
fundamentally spatial phenomenon. This is true in the first instance in that the category turns 
on patterns of mobility between rural and urban spaces. Marx also points to a series of spatial 
transformations -- re-grouping of populations, conversions of land for housing, the 
construction of transport infrastructure – needed to enable secondary forms of exploitation. At 
the same time, this bundle of spatial transformations entails the production of new social and 
ecological vulnerabilities. Marx’s notes are replete with references both to the vulnerability of 
emerging clusters of rural housing to disease outbreaks and to the seasonal and temporary 
character of incomes. All of this ultimately worked in tandem to deepen the vulnerability of 
surplus workers to irregular forms of labour exploitation: ‘The pauperism of the agricultural 
labourers is ultimately a motive for their eviction; it is also the chief source of their miserable 
housing, which breaks down their last power of resistance, and makes them mere slaves of the 
landed proprietors and the farmers’ (1990: 849). 
 
The point here is that Marx’s approach can give us some purchase on how to make sense of 
the recurrence of financial interventions in the groundnut basin and elsewhere. Understanding 
(neo)colonial agrarian systems through the lens of latent surplus populations helps to capture 
not just how climate vulnerabilities are produced, but also how integral they are to the 
mobilization of cheap labour. Two points are important. First, ‘latent’ surplus populations 
often remain bound up with circuits of capital accumulation through diverse forms of labour 
exploitation, which are enabled by their continued subjection to ‘secondary’ forms of 
exploitation and often deepened by the production of new spatial and ecological 
configurations. Second, these are developments that necessarily need to be examined 
historically, and with an eye to the inter-working of long-run social and ecological structures 
with conjunctural dynamics. This is an approach, I argue, that can help us both to historicize 
the crisis tendencies of peripheral agrarian regimes, and also to explain the recurrence of the 
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kinds of financial interventions of interest here. In the remainder of this article, I develop 
these arguments empirically in an historical analysis of groundnut production in Senegal.  
 
3. Latent surplus populations and groundnut production over the long run 
Groundnuts were introduced in West Africa in the sixteenth century, and initially cultivated 
primarily in the Gambia river basin. The large-scale commercial production of groundnuts, 
though, started in the mid-nineteenth century, driven by growing demand for plant oils in 
industrializing France, coupled with the adoption of tariffs favoring French merchants (and 
hence, goods primarily from French colonial territories). In the decade between 1840 and 
1850, groundnut exports from Senegal, by one estimate, grew from 1 metric ton to 5,000 
(Moitt 1989: 27; cf. Brooks 1975), and continued to grow rapidly throughout the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, reaching 95 000 metric tonnes by 1898 (Moitt 1989: 27). We usefully 
understand the rapid growth of the groundnut trade in this sense as the opening of a 
‘commodity frontier’ in Moore’s (2015: 63) terms -- a reconfiguration of space and nature to 
enable the renewed ‘commodity-oriented appropriation of unpaid work/energy’. Opening this 
frontier required a series of interlocking social, spatial, and ecological transformations which 
shaped the constitution of a considerable latent surplus population.  
 
Two developments in the nineteenth century were particularly important. The first was the 
mobilization of various forms of unfree labour for groundnut production. Searing (1993) 
argues that the early extension of groundnut production in Senegal took place primarily in 
places that had been closely tied to the Atlantic slave trade, and where grain production was 
subsequently carried out by slave labour. The expansion of the groundnut trade was also 
heavily dependent on the mobilization of unfree labour from elsewhere in the region. Moitt 
(1989) traces the concomitant growth of imports of enslaved labour, primarily from the 
French Soudan (now Mali), into groundnut producing areas, as acreages under cultivation 
grew after 1850. French administrators in Senegal, and English officials around the Gambia, 
began to note in the mid-nineteenth century that the groundnut trade ‘had the effect of 
inducing native proprietors of slaves to retain them for the fruit of their labours, instead of 
being anxious to dispose of them when an opportunity arose’ (Swindell and Jeng 2006: 10). 
The second key development was transport networks facilitating the extraction of export 
crops. The construction of the Dakar-Saint Louis Railway in 1885 strongly shaped the 
geography of production. Access to the railway was an important determinant of the location 
of expanded groundnut production. Thiès, an entrepôt on the line, became a key focal point 
of the groundnut trade, expanding outwards as new road networks were built (Moitt 2001: 
253-254). This helped shape the expansion of production into semi-arid areas where 
production was dependent on rainfall. 
 
This set of transformations also helped pave the way for the establishment of French 
dominance in the region (Brooks 1975). The colonial state that emerged out of these 
processes was heavily dependent on revenues from cash crops, particularly groundnuts, and 
its control over the movement of exports. It acted subsequently to reinforce the continued 
widening of groundnut production in the early years of the twentieth century. These 
developments worked through and helped reinforced what Cooper (1994: 1533) has usefully 
labelled ‘arterial’ patterns of state power typical of colonial Africa more broadly – in which 
the direct application of violent power in and around strategically central cities and transport 
infrastructure was mixed with ‘indirect’, sporadic, and arbitrary patterns of authority 
elsewhere. This state structure had significant implications for the character of groundnut 
production itself – particularly the property regime under which it was carried out. There 
were efforts at formalizing private property throughout the nineteenth century, but 
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administrators had conceded by the early twentieth century that these had failed outside of 
Saint Louis and Dakar where in practice the administration lacked the capacity to implement 
them (Boudillon 1911: 12). 
 
The continued expansion of the colonial export economy after 1900, particularly after the 
formal abolition of slavery, thus depended on the creation and exploitation of what we 
usefully understand as a latent surplus population, mobilized primarily through secondary 
forms of exploitation. Poll taxes -- annual fixed rates per head, regardless of income -- were a 
crucial means of creating dependence on cash incomes in the context of the formal abolition 
of slavery. One official would note in 1905 that: ‘Our poll tax has enabled us to improve the 
African’s moral character by giving him habits of work’ (qtd. Idrissa 1993: 97). These taxes 
were generally successful at driving an increase in cash crop production, and particularly of 
groundnuts. Indeed, the poll tax worked in no small part by driving patterns of seasonal 
labour migration from elsewhere in Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) to the groundnut 
basin (see David 1980; Klein and Roberts 1987). It was common for migrants to work as 
navétanes on larger landholdings during the groundnut season -- given a plot to work (with 
their own seed and tools) in exchange for some negotiated combination of fees payable after 
the sale of the harvest, a share of the crop itself, and/or a certain number of days per week of 
labour on the landlord’s fields (David 1980: 178). 
 
The poll tax worked in tandem with patterns of indebtedness revolving around the seasonal 
temporality of rainfed cultivation in mobilizing labour. By the early twentieth century, West 
African export economies were dominated by three trading companies: the French 
Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and Société Commerciale de l’Ouest 
Africain, and the British United Africa Company (see Austen 1987: 130). All three operated 
what has usefully been described as a ‘rudimentary “trading economy”, wherein 
manufactured goods of mediocre quality destined for immediate consumption… were 
offered, at greatly inflated prices, against agricultural products collected during the trading 
season’ (Coquéry-Vidrovitch 1975: 597). The CFAO was the primary firm operating in 
Senegal, holding a virtual monopoly over groundnut exports from Senegal. The CFAO and 
its competitors typically bought groundnuts from traders, who would normally have 
purchased them from smaller merchants in direct contact with growers. Debts incurred to 
merchants for food, seed, and other subsistence costs during the dry season (‘la soudure’) 
were the most significant means of mobilizing groundnut production.  
 
The intersection of debt and seasonal rainfall, then, was vital to the mobilization of latent 
surplus populations as irregular labour in this context. It allowed the production and 
extraction of cheap raw materials at minimal risk or cost to the CFAO. Indeed, by 1900, the 
CFAO was lobbying in Paris against the formation in AOF of concessionary property along 
the lines of those that granted millions of hectares in French Equatorial Africa and the 
Belgian Congo to rubber and timber plantations (CFAO 1900). This structure of property 
relations has had enduring impacts. As Oya (2001: 133) aptly notes ‘Historically, colonists, 
capitalist entrepreneurs and, after Independence…, state institutions concentrated on the 
distribution, marketing and processing of the Senegalese export product... On the other hand, 
production was left to peasant farmers’ (see also Founou-Tchuigoua 1981; Boone 1992). In 
short, capital was directly involved in profitable marketing and processing activities, while 
shifting the costs and risks of agricultural production onto a range of latent surplus 




These patterns of development have had two significant and enduring impacts. First, they 
worked to produce a state heavily dependent on earnings from groundnut exports, and deeply 
entangled with merchant capital (see Boone 1992). The expansion of poll taxes (probably 
inadvertently) deepened the state’s dependence on groundnuts. In 1898, poll taxes worth 
about 15 thousand francs were collected, against colonial revenues of 3.96 million (Seligman 
1900: 38). Poll taxes and other head taxes amounted to an average 39 percent of colonial 
revenue between 1907 and 1957 (Huillery 2014: 35). Table 1 shows the weight of Senegalese 
exports (of which groundnuts were by far the largest crop) in total customs earnings from 
AOF from 1916-1921. At the end of that decade, a report would note that ‘in 1927, exports 
from Senegal represented 57 percent of the total commerce of [AOF]… this commerce is 
driven, at a rate on the order of 90 percent, by exports of groundnuts’ (GGAOF 1928: 24-25).  
 
 
Table 1 – Customs Receipts in AOF (in ‘000s of Francs). Adapted from Ministère des 
Colonies (1921: 102), author’s calculations. 
 
Year AOF Total Senegal Senegal as percent 
of total 
 
1916 13523 8886 65.7 
1917 20027 9730 48.6 
1918 21685 11989 55.3 
1919 37284 19093 51.2 
1920 52167 29448 65.4 




The second lasting effect was the production of vulnerability to seasonal and annual 
fluctuations in rainfall. As noted above, public and private investments were primarily made 
in the development of transport networks facilitating the extraction of export crops. Barring 
sporadic efforts to build deep wells (see Tignor 1987: 95), no comparable investments were 
made in irrigation in the groundnut basin. Even in the early twentieth century administrators 
were well aware of some of the contradictions inherent in this model. One report from 1923, 
for instance, suggests a need to build canals, reservoirs or other means of moving water from 
the Gambia and Senegal rivers: 
The commerce of Senegal is undermined by a growing shortage of water 
which increasingly restricts cultivation. It is incontestable that water table 
levels are falling and there is a scramble for water. Water provision is a 
function of seasonal rainfall, and it is highly unlikely that digging wells will 
do much to improve the situation. (CAF 1923: 389) 
Crucially, though, the vulnerability to variable rainfall was intimately linked both to the 
particular patterns of secondary exploitation through indebtedness that worked to mobilize 
groundnut production in the absence of widespread enclosures, and difficult to alter given the 
systematic lack of investment in the production process. In something of a parallel to patterns 
recently highlighted by Mullenite (2019) in post-emancipation British Guiana, where 
underinvestment in flood management worked to drive down wages on sugar plantations by 
displacing relatively autonomous black communities, we can suggest here that the kinds of 
infrastructures that were and weren’t constructed were intimately linked to the production of 
certain kinds of relative surplus populations. These uneven patterns of water access have 
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proven relatively durable. Estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization continue to 
show a very limited proportion of cultivated area in general equipped for irrigation, and 
disproportionately lower levels of irrigation use in groundnut production than for other crops 
(FAO 2005). Recent studies have also shown that poverty levels and productivity in 
groundnut producing areas are relatively more vulnerable to rainfall fluctuations than 
elsewhere in Senegal (e.g. Cabral 2012), and that patterns of labour migration to and from the 
groundnut basin are still closely timed around seasonal rainfall variations (Martin-Gutierrez 
et al. 2016; Hummel 2016).  
 
There are deep-rooted contradictions here: the close entanglement of groundnut production 
with seasonal rainfall also implies a configuration of labour and nature highly vulnerable to 
occasional failures of annual rains. At the same time, the particular ‘arterial’ geographies of 
property rights, capital, and state power identified above also inhibited investments that 
might raise productivity or mitigate these exposures. This despite the fact that colonial 
officials were, at times, aware of these tensions -- as in the call for investments in irrigation 
quoted above. These contradictions have been amplified in recent years as accelerating 
climate change has been manifested in more severe and more frequent droughts, and in 
considerably lower average rainfall than in the first half of the twentieth century (see Figure 
1, also Brandt et al. 2013; Herrmann and Tappan 2013; Sarr et al. 2013; Sambou 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Annual June-October total rainfall in mm, national average for Senegal, and 10 




The French colonial state, in short, depended for its own reproduction on the continued 
engagement in groundnut cultivation of a significant ‘latent’ surplus population reliant on 
precarious cash incomes from a variety of irregular forms of work, but not ‘absorbed’ by 
(urban) labour markets. The persistence of this latent surplus population, given the fragile 
socio-ecological conditions in which it took place, along with low returns to farmers and 
migrant labourers, has been subject to a number of crises driven by the conjunction of 
economic restructuring with weather and climate variations. Responses to these forms of 
crisis have often taken similar forms, seeking to shift the terms of secondary exploitation 
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the next two sections, starting with the adoption of SIPs in the 1930s here, and turning to 
tentative efforts at establishing IBAI policies in the aftermath of the collapse of these colonial 
systems and their immediate postcolonial replacements. 
 
4. SIPs and the failed transformation of secondary exploitation 
The first major episode of crisis took place in the early 1930s. There were a number of 
underlying factors here, which were compounded by poor rainfall in 1931. After WWI, tax 
increases -- in 1915, average taxes per head in AOF totaled F2.03, by 1927, 10.52 (Coquéry-
Vidrovitch 1977: 131) -- intensified the reliance of Senegalese peasants (and the state) on 
groundnut production, and drove increasing numbers of migrants from elsewhere in AOF to 
migrate seasonally to the groundnut basin (see David 1980). The railway and road 
infrastructure through which the trading economy was operated was also extended 
considerably after WWI, generally through forced labour exacted from very much the same 
areas involved in groundnut production (see Fall 1993). The construction of a railway from 
Thiès to Kayes (in contemporary Mali) in the first decade of the twentieth century was driven 
in no small part by the desire to smooth the movement of groundnuts from inland areas 
towards the coast (Moitt 2001: 255).  
 
Simultaneously, though, colonial trading companies were shifting towards higher-margin 
plantation crops, especially cotton and cocoa, which were primarily grown elsewhere. The 
CFAO expanded its operations considerably across West Africa, including into British 
territories and Central Africa. Plantation crops made up an increasing proportion of company 
revenues (see Coquéry-Vidrovitch 1977: 127). This shift was driven in no small part by the 
rapid growth of competing peanut exports from the Southern United States in the preceding 
decade. The coincidence of boll weevil infestation and rising wartime demand for plant oils 
in Europe drove a rapid conversion of acreages in the South from cotton to peanut 
cultivation. Some colonial administrators in West Africa, seeing both a danger from 
competing groundnut exports and declining prices (e.g. Ministère des Colonies 1921: 10-15), 
and an increasing need for (or, opportunity to provide) replacements for American cotton in 
French industry (Ministère des Colonies 1922: 263), were quite keen to promote the 
development of cotton plantations in AOF. Groundnut production in AOF, accordingly, 
peaked in terms of value in 1926, and in terms of tonnage in 1930.  
 
These pressures were amplified by the deterioration of the transport networks that had 
facilitated groundnut exports -- administrators raised growing concerns about the inefficiency 
of the Thiès-Kayes railway in particular in the later parts of the 1920s (see Moitt 2001: 260). 
Transport problems were amplified from the start of the 1920s by accumulating losses of soil 
quality in the regions nearest to the Dakar-Saint Louis railway line which had been 
intensively cultivated the longest. Cultivation was gradually shifted east and towards the 
interior (see David 1980: 159). All of these trends, compounded by below average rainfall in 
1931 (see figure 1), led to the collapse of the 1932 harvest.  
 
These events did contribute to a significant movement of people into cities across AOF, 
especially Dakar. According to official statistics, the city’s population expanded from 53 982 
people in 1931 to 92 999 in 1936 (Coquéry-Vidrovitch 1977: 150). Apart from seeking to 
maintain customs payments on export crops and keep up the supply of cheap raw materials to 
France, then, efforts to restore groundnut production were also motivated by political and 
security concerns about Africans into urban spaces. One official would argue in 1938 that 
‘we must not create a proletariat which… would rapidly become dangerous for French 
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sovereignty’ (qtd. Marseille 1982: 33). Officials saw the maintenance of a latent surplus 
population as a key imperative both politically and economically.1 
 
One of the key responses to these issues involved the dramatic expansion of SIPs and of seed 
credit disbursed through them. In doing this, administrators re-purposed an existing policy 
tool. SIPs were first adopted in Algeria in the late nineteenth century, and had been 
established in small numbers in AOF starting in 1910. As noted in Section 1, These were 
flexible institutions that served a variety of purposes in different contexts. SIPs were 
consistently justified in terms of the lack of foresight of indigenous populations in dealing 
with irregular rainfall. This dated to their earliest iterations in Algeria, where SIPs were 
introduced as a means of protecting ‘those who by their lack of foresight are not able to long 
survive’ periods of poor rainfall (Lecoq 1903: 1). This framing survived the translation of 
SIPs into AOF in general and their expansion in Senegal in particular in the 1930s with little 
modification.  
 
The particular modalities of the expansion of SIPs in Senegal in the early 1930s effectively 
sought to resolve the crisis in groundnut production by (1) organizing and disciplining 
migrant labour and (2) by shifting flows of interest away from smaller traders operating in 
Senegal and towards metropolitan capital. Administrators identified a lack of affordable seed 
available as a critical hindrance to the renewal of groundnut production after the failed 
harvest. While there had been some increase in SIPs’ activity in the 1920s, in 1930 seed 
advances amounted to 14 791 tonnes; in 1932 (the growing season following the failed 
harvest) the figure was more than double: 38 243, and hovered around 50 000 in the latter 
part of the decade (David 1980: 465). A particular emphasis was placed on SIPs as a 
mechanism for organizing migrant labour in Sine-Saloum in particular (at the time the most 
significant groundnut growing region), where SIPs took on an explicit role in distributing 
seeds on credit to arriving navétanes (David 1980: 102). 
 
In effect, then, the rapid expansion of SIPs in the 1930s sought to restructure existing patterns 
of secondary exploitation away from merchants. This was a process very much driven by the 
colonial state and into which it worked to enroll financial capital. The Caisse Centrale de 
Crédit Agricole Mutuel (CCCAM), an agricultural bank modelled on the French Crédit 
Agricole, was established by decree in 1931. The CCCAM borrowed funds from the central 
government and private lenders in order to lend on to SIPs or to larger cultivators. SIPs 
distributed seed to farmers on credit, to be repaid with 25 percent interest out of the harvest. 
Effectively, these initial transactions ‘saddled the Senegalese Provident Societies with a large 
debt’ from the first years of the 1930s (Tignor 1987: 103), which was amplified because the 
price of seeds nearly tripled in the time between the planning and implementation of the 
expanded SIPs scheme (costing 29 million francs rather than the 10 million originally 
budgeted). The SIPs were forced to take out a 50-year loan to enable repayment (Tignor 
1987: 103). This was followed in 1936 by the establishment of a Fonds Commun des Sociétés 
de Prévoyance as an intermediary for lending to individual SIPs. 
 
The expansion of SIPs was contested, not least by the trading houses themselves, who 
continued to favour ‘indebtedness arrangements as a way to bind individual cultivators to 
their firms and to make the conduct of trade relatively predictable’ (Tignor 1987: 106). In 
practice, though, SIPs complicated this system by introducing a new source of seed credit, 
 
1 On these broader debates about urbanization, see Cooper 1996; Bernards 2018. In Senegal 
in particular, this also involved the suppression of industrialization, see Boone 1992. 
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but still fundamentally sought to keep latent surplus populations bound to groundnut 
production through relations of indebtedness (see Boone 1992: 46; Founou-Tchiouga 1981: 
53). This was particularly the case given the extent to which the expansion of SIPs was 
oriented towards providing credit in seed. Merchants continued to be the primary source of 
credit for basic survival items during the soudure. 
 
As a result, SIPs systematically struggled to collect repayments. The challenges posed by the 
persistence of merchant credit were reinforced by the decline of the railways (which were 
under close administrative control) and the increasing reliance of groundnut exports on truck 
transport networks largely under the control of Syrian merchants (see Moitt 2001: 263). This 
also facilitated an accelerated shift of cultivation away from relatively degraded soil in older 
groundnut regions close to the old rail network (see David 1980: 159). Arrears accumulated 
steadily throughout the 1930s and 1940s – in 1937-38, Senegalese SIPs reported arrears of 12 
220 metric tons of groundnuts, by 1946-47, the figure was 57 278 (Tignor 1987: 112). 
However, the relatively short-lived nature of the 1931 drought and the eventual recovery of 
global prices, coupled with the shift of production towards areas with less degraded soil, 
ultimately led to the restoration and continued expansion of groundnut exports by the end of 
the 1930s. The underlying contradictions highlighted in Section 3 were resolved only 
temporarily by these shifts, though. They became increasingly acute after the end of formal 
colonial rule. 
5. IBAI and the antinomies of neoliberalization 
Here I want to return to the question of what is (and isn’t) new about IBAI and contemporary 
patterns of dispossession. While IBAI is a distinctly neoliberal mode of intervention, and 
responds in part to the consequences of structural adjustment, we ought nonetheless to make 
sense of its truncated rollout in Senegal as an attempted response to the intensification of 
underlying contradictions highlighted above in the context of the rolling back of postcolonial 
institutions. We can also link the limited success of IBAI in Senegal to the way it intersects 
with the shifting configurations of indebtedness, labour, and ecology highlighted by the 
reading of Marx’s writing on surplus populations developed here. 
 
After the formal end of colonial rule, rural cooperatives organized along comparable lines to 
the SIPs continued to play a significant role in the organization of groundnut production. The 
newly independent government of Senegal issued ‘Circulaire 32’ in 1962, articulating a 
vision of the shift of the cooperative movement from a tool of colonial domination to the 
‘vanguard’ of the drive to empower and modernize the rural economy (See Tuck 1987; 
Mbodj 1992). The Office National pour la Coopération et l’Assistance au Développement 
(ONCAD) operated programmes distributing seed and equipment input credits in kind, with 
relatively low rates of interest to be repaid out of harvests. Again, the demand for credit was 
strong. Where in the ten years before the program, an average of 3 444 tonnes of fertilizer 
was distributed annually, during the period of its operation the figure was 47 000 (Tuck 1987: 
83). Yet this took place alongside the ongoing tightening of climatic conditions – a secular 
decline in rainfall levels beginning in the 1960s, severe and extended droughts across the 
whole Sahel region in the 1970s, and accelerating problems of soil degradation and 
desertification (see Mackintosh 1989: 7). ONCAD’s loan portfolio grew, but production 
began to decline. Figs. 2a and 2b show the broad trend in export volumes and values, 
respectively, since the 1960s, based on data from the FAO. While exports of semi-processed 
outputs somewhat offset declining cultivation volumes for a time in the early 1970s, the value 
and volume of exports have both become increasingly volatile. ONCAD, in this context, was 
effectively bankrupt by 1980 and was one of the first casualties of structural adjustment. 
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The collapse of ONCAD itself was a major reason why Senegal the first African country to 
take up a structural adjustment programme. The period of structural adjustment was marked 
by the dismantling of the complex structures of state intervention in agrarian economies and 
the partial commercialization of groundnut markets -- albeit in practice, the liberalization of 
marketing and processing was carried out somewhat piecemeal. SONACOS (a state-owned 
peanut processing facility) was privatized as late as 2006, and has subsequently been re-
nationalized (see Oya and Ba 2013). Groundnut markets have nonetheless been marked by a 
substantial withdrawal of state credit and price control. This was rationalized, at least in part, 
as a restructuring in the interest of smallholders – the state, it was argued, artificially 
suppressed prices, so commercializing groundnut marketing would raise producer incomes 
(see e.g. Hathie and Lopez 2002). Structural adjustment, in short, can itself be read in part as 
an effort to resolve a long-run crisis driven by the accelerating contradictions of (neo)colonial 
groundnut regime, although as can be seen in Fig. 2, the success of structural adjustment in 
these terms was highly questionable.  
Groundnut production in this context has become increasingly volatile, and generally average 
production in the 2000s remained below that in the 1970s. Coupled with liberalization of 
investment, marketing, and property rights, this trend has driven a notable shift in agricultural 
investment away from the groundnut basin and towards the Senegal River basin in the north 
of the country, primarily for rice and maize production (see Koopmans 2012a; 2012b), as 
well as a minor boom in horticultural production in in the Cap Vert Peninsula, Thiès, and 
Saint Louis (overlapping somewhat with former groundnut growing regions) (see Baglioni 
2015; 2018). The latter in particular are strongly shaped by efforts to resolve the longer-run 
crises of groundnut production. The state made serious efforts to encourage new forms of 
export cultivation, particularly by facilitating investments by foreign agribusiness firms in 
export horticulture in former groundnut-growing regions, in the 1970s; this laid much of the 
groundwork for export firms to take advantage of liberalization (see Mackintosh 1989).  
Figure 2: Time-series of annual groundnut exports, 1961-2011, by value (a) and volume (b). 
















































































In this context, there have been deepening patterns of differentiation within the groundnut 
basin, with large and medium farmers, particularly those organized along more ‘capitalist’ 
lines, better equipped to profit from trading and marketing, employ more migrant labour, and 
lend money to smaller farmers (see Oya 2001). These trends have led to long-term shifts in 
forms of agrarian work. Navétanat arrangements, already in decline by the end of the colonial 
period as the eastward shift of groundnut production was accompanied by changes in land 
rights (David 1980: 407 et passim), appear to be virtually non-existent (see Oya 2015: 48). 
The increasing share of production taken up by medium and large capitalist farmers has led to 
a corresponding increase in seasonal wage labour, hired on a variety of different time-scales 
(ranging from 6-8 months to daily casual labour) (Oya 2015: 48-50). Nonetheless, the 
intersection of ecological vulnerabilities with indebtedness continues to be an important 
driver of labour mobilization. One survey in the late 1990s found that a substantial portion of 
wage labour was performed by failed small-scale farmers, particularly from the North of the 
groundnut basin, citing ‘land degradation, lack of inputs… and in most cases, lack of seed’, 
along with ‘an increasing indebtedness to local traders, due to bad seasons’ as major drivers 
of migrant labour (Oya 2001: 143-144). Migrant labourers in the Groundnut Basin are also 
reported to increasingly move between groundnut harvests and export horticulture (see 
Baglioni 2015; 2018). Crucially, this also suggests there is no rigid divide between wage 
labourers and smallholder farmers, as household survival strategies typically combine 
multiple forms of activity. In short, while the terms of employment prevalent in groundnut 
growing regions appear to be shifting, the basic reliance of the sector on irregular forms of 
employment, and the key roles of intersecting patterns of indebtedness and ecological 
vulnerability in the mobilization of labour persist. 
 
Critically, while the importance of groundnuts as an export crop have declined dramatically, 
concerns about the volatility of groundnut production are, as in the colonial period, linked to 
fears of disorderly urbanization, and increasingly even outmigration to Europe. One report, 
for instance, notes that: 
Poverty, rural exodus, and the degradation of natural resources have reached 
hitherto unthinkable levels. Un- and underemployment remain the lot of hundreds 
of thousands of working-age adults. With high population growth rates, these 
phenomena look set to be amplified… Increased efforts at clandestine migration 
to Europe in recent years, especially among the youth, underline the urgency of 
outlining effective economic policies to reduce poverty and offer young people a 
chance at a future. (Faye et al. 2007) 
Against this backdrop, we can situate the turn to IBAI as part of a renewed series of policy 
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interventions aimed at modifying the conditions for secondary exploitation without altering 
underlying configurations of capital, labour, and nature. 
 
The government established the Compagnie Nationale d’Assurances Agricoles du Sénégal 
(CNAAS) in 2008. CNAAS is a public-private partnership, with financing from the 
Senegalese government and a pair of public-private banks (the Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole du Sénégal [CNCAS] and the Banque Nationale Pour le Développement 
Économique [BNDE]), alongside donor support through the World Bank’s Global Index 
Insurance Fund (GIIF) and the Banque Ouest Africaine du Développement (BOAD). This has 
been accompanied by wider efforts both in Senegal and in West Africa more broadly at 
developing regulatory frameworks supporting microinsurance as a means of providing 
alternative forms of social protection for agrarian and informal workers (see Bernards 2016). 
 
A pilot study led by the World Bank was carried out in 2009 and recommended the 
establishment of an index insurance scheme as a ‘safety net’ for small farmers (see World 
Bank 2009). This is a safety net rooted in a fundamentally individualized and marketized 
conception of climate risk: 
Access to formal risk financing instruments, such as insurance, can help Senegalese 
farmers transfer excessive losses to a third party (such as an insurance company) 
thus stabilizing household income, facilitating their access to credit, and ultimately 
enhancing their livelihoods. Thus, risk management is essentially the responsibility 
of individual farmers and their extended households. (2009: 3, emphasis added) 
Insurance here is held up as a means of enabling small farmers to increase production by 
expanding their access to formal credit. This framing has been repeated across a number of 
policy documents about index insurance:  
One reason for the low GDP contribution is that the productivity of the sector is 
low and must be developed. Irrigation projects along the Senegal river are one 
way to develop the sector. But this is not enough. Development means access to 
credit to buy seeds, machinery and fertilizer. Banks are reluctant to lend to 
farmers if harvests are threatened by droughts, floods, storms or insects. Insurance 
can be a catalyst here, because banks know that credits will be served even if 
disaster strikes. (SwissRE 2015: 7) 
As with the adoption of SIPs, then, IBAI interventions in Senegal are ultimately aimed at re-
shaping patterns of borrowing and indebtedness in ways that are expected to lead to higher 
productivity -- in this case access for smallholders to formal credit from banks and 
microfinance institutions rather than to traders or larger farms. The links between these 
programmes and concerns about urbanization and outmigration are, as in the colonial era, 
often explicit. For instance, the World Bank’s ‘Insuresilience’ initiative -- a key sponsor of 
the programme -- opens a discussion of Senegal in a recent annual report by noting that ‘The 
population itself has more than doubled since 1990 to a total of 16.3 million. Large numbers 
of people are moving to the urban areas of Senegal, and infrastructure and food supply are 
consequently subject to increasing stress’ (InsuResilience 2018: 29). 
 
Contemporary insurance initiatives, in another parallel to SIPs, also seek to do so by 
incorporating these risk management practices into global circuits of financial accumulation. 
This again has been driven by the state much more than by financial capital. Here the 
complex networks of ownership and participation in CNAAS are worth unpicking. In the first 
instance, ownership in CNAAS is split between the Senegalese government, which held 36 
percent of initial shares, a consortium of Senegalese and Ivoirian insurers and reinsurers (56 
percent), peasant organizations (7 percent), with a small number of remaining shares held by 
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individual shareholders (CNAAS 2015). The scheme has also established partnerships with 
agricultural lenders operating in Senegal, including CNCAS (also part-owned by the state) to 
offer IBAI products to borrowers (Ndoye 2017). The state plays a critical role in 
underpinning flows of premium income by subsidizing payments up to 50 percent. 
Reinsurance is a particularly critical mechanism by which these income streams are 
circulated into financial markets. CNAAS policies are entered into a set of reinsurance 
arrangements covering 75 percent of premiums. SwissRE is the largest participant here, 
taking on 55 percent of CNAAS’s ceded policies through a quota share treaty, another 35 
percent of ceded policies are sold on to West African reinsurers (Sen-RE, CICA-Re, and 
Africa-RE) (CNAAS 2015). These forms of accumulation are substantially underpinned by 
the state and multilateral authorities. The day-to-day operations of CNAAS have been 
substantially financed by the BOAD, which has made loans in support of a number of 
procurement initiatives – including rain sensing equipment (CNAAS 2017) and integrated 
information systems (CNAAS 2015). The sale of policies is also primarily managed by a 
broker (PlaNet Guarantee Senegal), which is a subsidiary of Paris-based NGO PlaNet 
Finance Group, with capital held by a number of public, commercial, charitable 
organizations, including the World Bank’s Insuresillience fund. PlaNet Guarantee has 
received significant support from major donors, including the World Bank, and British and 
German development agencies.  
 
Like the SIPs, the trajectory of index insurance in Senegal is mixed. The number of policies 
and amount of premiums collected has grown fairly steadily since the first schemes were 
rolled out in 2011. In 2012, CNAAS had issued 2 325 policies,2 paying FCFA 28 687 294 in 
premiums, against an insured value of FCFA 186 395 000. By 2015, the most recent 
published figures at the time of writing, those numbers had all more or less quadrupled -- 
with 8 962 policies, FCFA 124 301 461 in premiums, and FCFA 765 143 963 worth of crops 
(Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Équippement Rurale 2018: 8). On one hand, this is a 
significant rate of growth in a short period of time. On the other, this still represents a very 
small proportion of crops (and of the total population engaged in groundnut production). By 
one estimate, gross written premiums for microinsurance overall in Senegal actually declined 
by 35.93 percent between 2011 and 2014 (MIC 2016: 37). At least one previous study has 
also pointed to limited benefits for participant farms (Ricome et al. 2017).  
 
We can make sense both of this mixed record and of the limited character of the intervention 
itself with reference to the wider patterns both of conjunctural crisis and of long run 
structures described above. A first key point is that uneven exposure to climate risks and 
informal patterns of indebtedness have both long been closely entwined with the mobilization 
of cheap labour for groundnut production. IBAI makes sense as an intervention in the context 
in which exposures to fluctuations in rainfall ultimately remain key foundations on which the 
mixed circuits of state enterprise and merchant capital marketing, processing, and distributing 
groundnuts work. Introducing new modes of financial practice has frequently both appealed 
as a policy intervention and proved difficult because particular forms of secondary 
exploitation driven by exposure to seasonal fluctuations in rainfall and the commodification 
of the means of survival are vital to the productive organization of the sector. IBAI, then, is a 
distinctly neoliberal mode of intervention, drawing heavily on wider narratives of ‘risk 
management’ and ‘financial inclusion’. It is also perhaps especially problematic for this 
reason – individualized conceptions of ‘risk management’ underlying IBAI are a poor fit for 
 
2 The number of policies does not correspond to the number of individuals covered, as many 
of these policies were issued to cooperatives or producer associations rather than individuals.  
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the increasing stratification and growing reliance on wage labour visible in the groundnut 
basin. Yet, ultimately it also represents a new iteration of a longer pattern, and is best 
understood in terms of the long-run entanglements of state, ecology, and latent surplus 
populations involved in groundnut production.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The fact that repeated interventions have sought, with limited success, to mitigate the social 
and ecological limits of groundnut production in Senegal by turning to financial innovations 
rather than facilitating wider-ranging transformations is notable. Colonial and neoliberal 
efforts to rescue groundnut production were both ultimately doomed because they were 
premised on an understanding of an undifferentiated peasantry lacking adequate facilities for 
managing weather risk. They represent efforts to tinker with the configuration of nature and 
secondary exploitation through which latent surplus populations have been mobilized in the 
production of groundnuts for export. The 1930s crisis was ultimately resolved by renewed 
investments in transport infrastructures which enabled the extension of the commodity 
frontier, the recovery of world prices, and the short-lived nature of the drought in question. 
Contemporary efforts, meanwhile, are increasingly fraught in light of accumulating social 
and ecological contradictions -- as noted above, average rainfall has yet to recover to pre-
1980s levels, most analysts expect more frequent and more severe droughts, soil and 
vegetation quality have failed to fully recover despite ‘regreening’; and both the stratification 
of groundnut farms and seasonal wage labour are increasingly common. 
 
Nonetheless, there are significant parallels between colonial and neoliberal interventions. 
These parallels suggest that a recurrent tendency of interventions to aim at smoothing out 
contradictions and mitigating social and ecological vulnerabilities in moments of crisis rather 
than facilitating wider ranging changes is more than bad policy, but is instead indicative of 
more fundamental dynamics. I have argued in the above that Marx’s approach to studying 
latent surplus populations ‘constantly on the point of passing over’ offers us highly useful 
clues in unpicking these relationships. Marx helpfully emphasizes two related points: (1) the 
multiple temporalities of rural dispossession, and (2) the entanglement of secondary 
exploitation and ecological rhythms in mobilizing ‘surplus’ rural labour for the production of 
cheap raw materials.  
 
This has three wider implications. First, in practical terms this study adds to a body of critical 
work suggesting that interventions like IBAI are likely doomed to fail, even on their own 
terms as means of extending ‘access’ to insurance (see da Costa 2013; Isakson 2015). Not 
only do such forms of climate adaptation fail to address underlying vulnerabilities, they have 
striking similarities to previous failed interventions. Second, and more generally, it suggests 
that the ways in which we talk about processes of dispossession, displacement, and the 
making of ‘surplus’ populations in neoliberal times could do with greater attention to the 
dynamic and fluid character of surplus populations themselves. This article in particular has 
highlighted the close entanglements of the state in Senegal with a system of agrarian 
production reliant on the incorporation of labour from variegated latent surplus populations. 
Rather than the ‘non-absorption’ of a certain segment of dispossessed peasants, then, we can 
usefully point to longer-run processes through which such latent surplus populations remain 
wrapped up in the circuits of capital. Finally, we can make sense of new modes of 
intervention with reference to the difficulties implicit therein. Interventions like IBAI are 
often talked about as extensions of wider processes of neoliberalization or financialization. 
Set in the longer context of the production and reproduction of latent surplus populations in 
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